

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD167, PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#10BAGHDAD167**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">10BAGHDAD167</a>	<a href="#">2010-01-22 16:50</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Baghdad</a>

Appears in these articles:  
<http://www.spiegel.de>

VZCZCXYZ0018  
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0167/01 0221650  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 221650Z JAN 10  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6243  
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000167

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [KISL](#) [KCOR](#)  
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN  
WEEKENDS

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 3492  
[B](#). 08 BAGHDAD 3654

Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)  
)

[1](#)1. (U) This is a xxxxx reporting cable.

[1](#)2. (S) SUMMARY: xxxxx met with local leader Sheikh xxxxx. During our lengthy discussions the Sheikh shared his belief that the USG has poorly utilized its influence in Iraq, leaving the way open for Iran to advance its agenda at USG expense. He went on to describe Iranian government attempts to buy his influence on a recent trip he made to Iran. End Summary.

A new twist on &what happens in vegas, stays in vegas8  
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[1](#)3. (S) Sheikh xxxxx on January 13 to discuss his recent trip to Iran. He told the xxxxx that he has been courted by Iranian officials in an effort to garner more support and influence among well-placed Iraqis in the middle Euphrates area. He noted that the &handler8 for the tribal leaders in this area is xxxxx, who has long

family ties locally.

14. (S) The public reason for xxxxx trip to Tehran was for a medical check-up. He privately told xxxxx that his trip was more for pleasure than medical treatment and included one or more short-term marriages (i.e. with state-sanctioned prostitutes) and other entertainment. xxxxx shared that other (unnamed) tribal leaders had enjoyed similar privileges while guests of the Iranian regime recently.

Dashed expectations

15. (S) The Sheikh suggested that some Iraqi figures are more susceptible to Iranian influence because of disillusionment with the United States. During the meeting with xxxxx asked repeatedly, &Why have the Americans let us down? After he and other tribal sheikhs visited the White House and met then-President Bush in 2008, he expected to benefit financially from the Americans. Instead, he suggested that the Americans did nothing for him, even after he reported on Iranian activities in Muthanna (Ref A). &The United States did not secure their friends, the sheikhs, financially, and has left them vulnerable to Iranian temptations.

16. (S) xxxxx also complained that while tribal leaders in fairly stable areas used their influence to help minimize insurgent activities over the past several years, they have received nothing for their efforts. Cooperative sheikhs in insurgent hotbeds like Anbar, in contrast, received benefits from the Americans. xxxxx cited Abu Risha as an example, noting he received money, projects, and other perquisites for his cooperation. He finished by noting that several of the White House-invited tribal leaders have been quietly grumbling. He states that he has had conversations on this perceived inequity with parliamentarian xxxxx from Diwaniyah.

17. (S) Additionally, xxxxx was frustrated with the current regime in Baghdad. He stated that the United States' support of the Maliki government has only increased Iran's influence in Iraq, enabling operatives to influence political decisions and diminish national sovereignty. The Iraqi government has not made progress in fighting poverty, it has failed to provide essential services, and it is full of corruption. He asked if the United States is supporting Iran. &Why? Because you have American troops on the ground, but you are advancing Iranian interests without costing them anything.

Comment

18. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known Q8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known for shifting their loyalties based on financial considerations. PM Maliki's Isnad/Tribal Support Councils are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Susceptible sheikhs will trade their influence for financial support especially if the sheikh is not independently wealthy.

(Note: xxxxx and does not independently enjoy a large bankroll. End note.) In turn, the sheikh can mobilize supporters, when needed (e.g. Ref B). The influence, however, is rented and not bought. If the financial contributions suddenly stop, much of the support may also cease. xxxxx considers this true for Iranian influence in the region as well. If Iran continues to pay for support among influential sheikhs, the

Islamic Republic will likely increase its influence. If and when the money dries up, so will the cooperation among these rented sheikhs. End Comment.

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